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1. Colour and Colour Theories 
Colours play an important role in various aspects of our lives including 
social, political, psychological, and epistemological. Despite their pervasiveness, 
however, their nature remains as elusive as ever. The theories most frequently 
appearing in the literature fall under three general rubrics: realism, subjectivism, 
and eliminativism. Realism says that colours are physical properties of objects. 
Some realists identify colours with ways of altering light (e.g. Hilbert and Byrne 
2003, Tye 2000) while others identify them with bases of dispositions to cause 
colour experiences (e.g. Jackson 1996, McLaughlin 2003). Subjectivism says that 
colours are dispositions to cause colour experiences (e.g. Johnston 1992). 
Eliminativism says that despite appearances objects are not actually coloured.1  
Colour realism is attractive for a variety of reasons. Firstly, it seems to 
offer the best explanation for colour phenomenology: what best explains why 
objects look coloured is that they are coloured. Secondly, it preserves the 
intuition that colour experience does not involve a massive and systematic error. 
Thirdly, it is consistent with the claim that colour discourse is largely true since it 
maintains that colour predicates pick out colour properties of objects. Many 
                                                
1 See Hardin 1988, Maund 1995, Arstila 2005. 
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philosophers and colour scientists, however, argue that despite its initial appeal, 
colour realism is false; nothing is actually coloured2.  
Those who find both realism and eliminativism unattractive, embrace 
some form of subjectivism3. Many subjectivists maintain that colours should be 
identified with dispositions (e.g. Johnston 1992). But since dispositions are not 
causally efficacious, they do not seem to be good candidates for colour4. Realists, 
on the other hand, seem to think that eliminativism is a better alternative than 
subjectivism. For example, Frank Jackson claims that if realism is false, «we 
should be eliminativists about colour. We should not embrace subjectivism» 
(Jackson 2007: 170). Eliminativists welcome this stance since they deny that 
objects are coloured. C.L. Hardin, for example, argues that there is no reason to 
postulate that colours are physical properties of objects:  
 
Realists hold that the world contains both spectral reflectances and experiences of color. 
Color antirealists agree, and point out that spectral power distributions and color 
experiences are jointly sufficient to explain the gamut of chromatic phenomena. We need 
not invoke the colors of commonsense realism at all. So why should we include them in 
our ontology? (2003: 201-202)  
 
Mark Johnston accepts Hardin’s claim that colour realism is false but rejects 
Jackson’s claim that eliminativism is a better alternative than subjectivism. He 
argues that eliminativism is unacceptable because it would render our «core» 
beliefs about colour false, thereby depriving us of colour discourse: 
                                                
2 See Hardin 1988, Maund 1995, Thompson 1995, Arstila 2005, Cosmides and Tooby 
1995. 
3 See Boghossian and Velleman 1989, Johnston 1992, McGilvray 1994. 
4 See Jackson 1996. 
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[W]ere such [core] beliefs to turn out not to be true we would then have trouble saying 
what they were false of, i.e., we would be deprived of a subject matter rather than 
having our views changed about a given subject matter. (2001: 221)  
 
Johnston is not explicit about which of our colour beliefs are core and which are 
not, but claims that typically «there are many legitimate ways of drawing the 
core/periphery distinction» (2001: 221). He argues that rejecting peripheral 
beliefs about colour is unproblematic since doing so would not deprive us of 
colour discourse. Rejecting core beliefs, on the other hand, is problematic 
precisely because it would deprive us of colour discourse. Subjectivism rejects 
only peripheral beliefs about colour. Therefore, it does not deprive us of colour 
discourse. Eliminativism, on the other hand, rejects both core and peripheral 
beliefs about colour. Johnston thus concludes that eliminativism cannot preserve 
colour discourse and as such it is not an adequate account of colour. 
The aim of this paper is to challenge Johnston’s claim that eliminativism 
cannot preserve colour discourse. Given that serious problems have plagued 
both realism and subjectivism about colour, it behooves us to examine whether 
eliminativism is a plausible alternative. I shall argue that a particular version of 
eliminativism, i.e., prescriptive colour fictionalism, is a viable alternative since it 
can preserve colour discourse in the absence of colours.  
 
2. Colour Fictionalism 
Colour fictionalism is a species of error theory. An error theory about 
colour can be understood as a conjunction of two claims: a conceptual and an 
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ontological5. According to the conceptual claim, colours are physical properties of 
external objects that cause colour experiences in normal perceivers.6 According to 
the ontological claim, there are no such properties.  
Colour fictionalism comes in two varieties: descriptive and prescriptive. 
Descriptive fictionalism says that the target discourse (in this case, colour 
discourse) is already treated as a fiction. Even though ordinary people seem to be 
expressing propositions that commit them to the existence of colour properties, 
in actuality they engage in some kind of pretense. Accordingly, when ordinary 
people utter statements ascribing colours to objects, e.g., ‘Lemons are yellow’, 
they express propositions of the form ‘In the fiction, lemons are yellow’. 
Descriptive fictionalists thus maintain that ordinary people do not have false 
metaphysical beliefs about the colours since they are merely pretending that 
objects are coloured (as the hidden operator ‘in the fiction’ indicates).  
If ordinary colour discourse is already treated as a fiction, we should 
expect to find that ordinary people treat colour discourse just as they treat any 
other fictional discourse. But they do not. It seems obvious that when ordinary 
people talk about fictional characters like Sherlock Holmes, they engage in some 
kind of pretense. After all, they do not believe that Sherlock Holmes is a real 
flesh and blood person. In this case, descriptive fictionalism seems to correctly 
describe the practices of ordinary people: utterances like ‘Sherlock Holmes is a 
detective’, in the mouths of ordinary people, seem to express propositions of the 
form ‘In Conan Doyle’s fictional works, Sherlock Holmes is a detective’. 
However, this is not so in the case of colour. Ordinary people do not seem to 
                                                
5 See Mackie 1977, Van Fraassen 1980, Maund 1995. 
6 There is no consensus regarding the nature of colour properties. Eliminativists deny 
that the properties we ordinarily identify with the colours are instantiated. 
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engage in some kind of pretense. They rather seem to believe that objects are, in 
fact, coloured. This suggests that ordinary colour discourse is assertoric, meaning 
it expresses beliefs7. Consequently, if colour eliminativism is true, ordinary 
people have false metaphysical beliefs about colours.  
Prescriptive fictionalists recognize that colour discourse entails or 
embodies a theory that is false, and recommend that we should «carry on 
employing the discourse, at least in many contexts, as if this were not the case» 
(Joyce 2001: 185). Doing so requires that we replace the act of assertion with the 
act of make believe so as to continue expressing propositions like ‘Lemons are 
yellow’ without assenting to their truth. This allows the content of statements 
ascribing colours to objects to remain unchanged. What changes is the force with 
which these statements are uttered. This is consistent with Peter Geach’s claim 
that a «thought may have just the same content whether you assent to its truth or 
not; a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet 
be recognizably the same proposition» (1995: 449). For example, ‘Lemons are 
yellow’ may be uttered with or without assertoric force. In either case, it 
expresses the same proposition, namely ‘Lemons are yellow’. Prescriptive 
fictionalists maintain that when such statements are uttered with assertoric force, 
they express false propositions. Nevertheless, they recommend that we carry on 
employing the discourse, in most contexts, as we have thus far, not because it 
entails or embodies a theory that is true, but rather because it entails or embodies 
a theory that is useful8.  
                                                
7 Realists generally accept this claim since it is consistent with their view. For a detailed 
discussion about the features of an assertoric discourse see Joyce 2001.  
8 As we will see in § 4, saying that a theory is useful need not entail that it is true. 
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As Joyce notes, the act of make believe differs from self-deception. When 
one utters a proposition p as an act of make believe, one knows that p is false but 
pretends that it is true9. Self-deception, by contrast, involves asserting p while 
believing that p is true. Fictive colour discourse, by its very nature, mimics 
ordinary discourse. Nevertheless, fictive discourse is distinguishable from 
ordinary discourse. Since those who engage in make believe do not really believe 
the fictive judgments they make –they only pretend (within less critical contexts) 
that they do –they can step out of make believe when pressed. To see this 
suppose that upon talking about lemons, I utter ‘Lemons are yellow’. Suppose 
further that you, knowing that I am a colour fictionalist, find my utterance 
puzzling enough to ask: “But you don’t really believe that lemons are coloured, 
do you?” I, as a sincere colour fictionalist, despite having just uttered an 
indicative statement involving lemons being yellow can reply “No, of course 
not”. In this more critical context, I am able to step out of make believe and 
explain that I was not asserting that lemons are yellow but rather pretending that 
they are coloured. Such context shifts allow one to easily move from fictive to 
ordinary discourse and back. However, no such shifts are possible in cases of 
self-deception10. The subject of self-deception will defend her belief not only in 
ordinary but also in more critical contexts.  
Prescriptive fictionalism has three components: the base discourse, the 
fiction, and the bridge principles11 that connect the former to the latter12. The base 
                                                
9 Joyce 2001. See also Currie 1990. 
10 For a lengthy discussion regarding the distinction between self-deception and the act 
of make believe see Joyce 2001. 
11 Initially, I used the term ‘bridge laws’ (see Gatzia 2007 and forthcoming). However, 
the term ‘bridge laws’ often brings to mind Carnap’s reductive models. Since my 
proposal is not supposed to be reductive, ‘bridge principles’ is a more suitable term. 
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discourse contains literal truths. Initially, I proposed that the base discourse 
contain the following: the Dual-Process Theory13 of colour vision, colour 
experiences, colour categories, and negative colour claims14. The dual-process 
theory consists of the trichromatic-process stage15 –which pertains to the light-
sensitive photoreceptors in the retina –and the opponent-process stage –which 
pertains to the neural components forming three opposing channels, 
blue/yellow, red/green, and black/white. Both stages are essential in explaining 
colour phenomenology. However, more is needed to explain how we manage to 
communicate effectively about the colours of things given that individual colour 
experiences can, and often do, differ significantly. Colour categories provide a 
suitable explanation: since colour categories are far less precise than our 
individual colour experiences, they allow us to effectively communicate with 
others even when our experiences vary significantly. Lastly, expressing some 
literal truths such as “No green objects exist” required that the base discourse 
contains some colour claims. However, the base discourse cannot contain any 
positive claims since the colour fictionalist maintains that they are literally false16. 
For example, statements of the form ‘a is red’, ‘b is green’, etc., cannot be 
included in the base discourse. 
The fiction and the bridge principles do contain positive colour claims when 
combined with the base discourse. The fiction contains the false theory of colour 
we ordinarily accept, i.e., physical objects are coloured. It thus includes positive 
claims of the form ‘a is red’, ‘b is green’, etc. A restriction to positive claims is 
                                                                                                                                            
12 See Nolan, Restall, West 2005. 
13 The term is taken from Palmer 1999: 110.  
14 See Gatzia 2007 and forthcoming. 
15 See Hering 1964. 
16 See Nolan, Restall, West 2005. 
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needed since in most vocabularies it will be possible to formulate both a sentence 
and its negation, and the fictionalist need not suggest that both of these are 
false17. The bridge principles connect the fiction to the base discourse. They thus 
allow us to go from information about the world to conclusions about the same 
subject matter, taking a detour through the fiction18.  The following bridge 
principles were initially proposed as the first approximation of complex 
principles that would connect the fiction to the base discourse, and vice versa19:  
 
(In the fiction) bananas are yellow if and only if (in typical conditions) 
bananas would cause the B/Y channel of an (human) observer to be in the 
state of excitation producing experiences that ordinary people would 
classify under the colour category ‘yellow’.  
 
(In the fiction) sapphire is blue if and only if (in typical conditions) 
sapphire would cause the B/Y channel of an (human) observer to be in a 
state of inhibition producing experiences that ordinary people would 
classify under the colour category ‘blue’. 
 
Similar principles were constructed for red and green. It was assumed that 
observers are in a neutral state of adaptation. Typical conditions were supposed 
to be understood as situational –that is, they depend on our purposes. Further 
assumptions about adaptation, specifications as to what counts as typical 
                                                
17 See Nolan, Restall, West 2005. 
18 Bridge principles are supposed to be contingent since things could be different in other 
possible worlds.  
19 See Gatzia 2007 and forthcoming. 
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conditions, etc., could have easily been incorporated in these principles. It should 
be stressed that the bridge principles are not proposed as an analysis of the 
nature of the colours. Reductive principles can only take us from truths to truths. 
Bridge principles, on the other hand, can take us from falsehoods to truths and 
back. This is, partly, what distinguishes prescriptive fictionalism from 
dispositional accounts of colour.  
I now think that there is another, perhaps better, candidate for the base 
discourse. Instead of using the dual-process theory, which can be restrictive and, 
perhaps even inconclusive, we should use «high-level statistical constructs build 
out of correlations between colour experiences and other phenomena»20. Johnson 
and Wright (2006) use this framework to argue that colours can be associated 
with high-level statistical constructs. They too accept that colour attributions 
would be largely untrue if realism were false, but argue that colour discourse is 
indispensible since many «areas of the cognitive sciences, biology, and even such 
fields as industrial engineering employ colour predicates in stating lawlike 
generalizations about the phenomena within their domain» (2006: 142). Echoing 
Johnston, they argue that an adequate theory of colour must be able to preserve 
colour discourse. However, they assume that eliminativism is not up to the task. 
Since they deny that colours can be identified with either physical properties of 
objects or dispositions to cause colour experiences, they propose that the best we 
can do is to associate colours with high-level statistical constructs. As they note, 
however, they are not proposing a philosophical, but rather a scientific, theory of 
colour: 
 
                                                
20 Johnson and Wright 2006: 140. 
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Importantly, we regard..[our]…theory of color as ‘scientific’ rather than ‘philosophical’ 
because the theory is not designed to give the metaphysical essence of colors, or to 
provide a conceptual analysis of color, or to accomplish many of the other tasks that 
have been assigned to traditional philosophical theories of color. Rather than telling us 
what colors are, the theory expresses what science tells us about colors. As we’ve seen, 
color science shows that colors are not easily captured in other terms –they are multiply 
realizable both microphysically and in terms of their spectral reflectance properties, etc. 
So at present we are not entitled to identify colors with some particular physical 
property, or any other relatively basic type of property. The best we can do is associate 
colors with a certain set of statistical regularities. (2006: 159)  
 
Even though their theory of colour is not philosophical, it can nevertheless be 
included in the base discourse of the philosophical theory I have proposed. 
Standard statistical methods that combine various data to extract latent variables 
can be used in the base discourse. High-level statistical constructs can be derived 
from «statistical correlations between various kinds of environments and the 
color experience of various species»21. Scientists use such standard methods to 
explain a wide range of phenomena that cannot be observed directly such as 
anxiety. Although anxiety is a second-order latent variable and as such it cannot 
be observed directly, it can nevertheless be measured in the sense that it can be 
derived from other lower-order latent variables, which can in turn be derived 
from the actual data. Third-order latent variables such as self-perception can also 
be derived from second-order latent variables such as anxiety, attitudes, and self-
                                                
21 Johnson and Wright 2006: 159. 
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efficacy22. Since such statistical models pertaining to colour would contain literal 
truths, they can be included in the base discourse. In particular, the base 
discourse would state certain statistical regularities that would be connected to 
the fiction via the bridge principles. The bridge principles can thus take us from 
information about the world to conclusions about the same subject matter, taking 
a detour through the fiction. Moreover, this theory has a virtue which is «alien to 
related approaches»23: 
 
combined theory of base discourse, bridge principles, and fiction has a uniform 
interpretation. As a result, the combined theory is closed under ordinary logical 
consequence. There is no difficulty explaining the validity of reasoning which detours 
through the fiction. (Nolan, Restall, West 2005: 314) 
 
The proposed account allows us to have our cake and eat it too: it allows 
us to carry on employing colour discourse, at least in many contexts, as if it did 
not entail or embody a false theory. Therefore, pace Johnston, eliminativism 
about colour need not deprive us of the subject matter.  
 
3. Advantages For Colour Fictionalism Over Colour Realism 
Explanatory Power. There are too many possible physical properties that 
can be causally responsible for colour appearances. Different colour appearances 
can be caused by homogeneous physical properties while the same colour 
                                                
22 See Karen Lawrson 2007: Structural Equation Model Examining Students prior to 
Mathematics, Experiences, and Impact on their Current Statistic’s Self-Perception: A 
Methodological Study, Doctoral Thesis, UMI Number: 3279480. 
23 Nolan, Restall, West 2005: 314. 
 Color Fictionalism 12 
appearances can be caused by heterogeneous physical properties24. In addition, it 
is well known that some colour appearances depend entirely on the immediate 
surrounding of the objects –as is the case with contrast colours –while others do 
not25. Lastly, there are widespread colour variations among normal perceivers26. 
Such cases present difficulties for reductive colour realism since it aims to 
identify colours with physical properties of objects. Colour fictionalism, on the 
other hand, can use statistical models in its base discourse. It can thus allow us to 
talk about colours precisely in accordance with the latent variables extracted 
from the scientific data, which takes into account a scientifically observed degree 
of variation27. In addition, the base discourse can determine which colour 
attributions are true (in the fiction) and which are false without reference to 
colour properties28. It follows that the proposed fictionalist account has greater 
explanatory power than colour realism. 
Colour Vision. Colour realists maintain that the primary function of our 
visual system is to track colours (or to discriminate among different physical 
stimuli which are to be identified with the colours)29. However, this claim is 
inconsistent with evidence from physiology and psychophysics. Empirical 
findings show that the primary function of colour vision is not to track colour 
properties, but rather to recognize patterns such as objects and forms30. Empirical 
findings from neuroscience provide further support for this claim31. Gouras, for 
                                                
24 See Nassau 1997. 
25 Hardin 1988. 
26 See Kuehni 2004 and Webster et al. 2000. 
27 See Johnson and Wright 2006. 
28 I show how this works in Gatzia forthcoming (a).  
29 See Hilbert 1992, Tye 2000, Hilbert and Byrne 2003. 
30 See Werner and Webster 2002. 
31 Gouras and Zrenner 1981. 
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example, argues that since only a relatively small proportion of cells in our visual 
cortex have any wavelength selectivity, it follows that «much of the neural 
machinery in the visual cortex is used for pattern recognition rather than color 
vision»32. Colour fictionalism is not committed to any particular account of 
colour vision. Thus, unlike colour realism, it is consistent with our most current 
scientific findings. 
Unity. Different species see different colours. Bees, for example, see 
ultraviolet colours while humans do not. Such variations across species present 
serious problems for colour realism since they limit its inquiry to colours as 
experienced by a single species, namely humans. For this reason, most colour 
realists accept some version of anthropocentric realism33. However, as Matthen 
notes, our experience cannot give us a proper grasp of colour because «we have 
access only to one kind of color experience. Humans see in color. But so do other 
animals» (1999: 47). Having a complete grasp of colour requires being inclusive 
of the colour experiences of various species. This, however, is not possible since 
«there is neither an experienced nor a natural unity that determines the 
membership of the class denoted by ‘red, blue, green, etc,’ in a way that properly 
accommodates differences amongst the animals that see in color» (Matthen 1999: 
47). This forces colour realists to limit the scope of their inquiry to colours as 
experienced by humans34. Colour fictionalism, by contrast, can be inclusive of the 
                                                
32 The quote is from an online paper by Peter Gouras titled “Color Vision” (See 
http://www.webvision.med.utah.edu/Color.html, particularly the section titled “Color 
and Form”). See also Gouras and Zrenner 1981. 
33 See Hilbert 1987. 
34 Instead of rejecting colour realism, Matthen proposes an account of colour vision that 
purports to be inclusive of the colour experiences of other species.  
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colour experiences of other species since actual data pertaining to different 
species will yield latent variables associated with their colour experiences.   
 
4. Is Colours Fictionalism too Good to be True? 
I have argued that prescriptive colour fictionalism has various advantages 
over colour realism. Many, however, are skeptical about prescriptive 
fictionalism. Szabo’-Gendler, for example, argues that prescriptive fictionalism is 
an absurd position since it recommends that we utter sentences we do not 
believe. But to do so, he argues, would amount to assenting to «Moorean 
sentences such as ‘There are Fs, but I do not believe that there are Fs’» (2001: 293).  
This argument targets a specific kind of prescriptive fictionalism, which 
Szabo’-Gendler calls ‘neo-conservativism’. The neo-conservative fictionalist 
denies that the theory that says that there are Fs –call it the F-theory –is true and 
embraces a superior theory that is inaccessible to us (although it may be 
accessible to creatures with superior cognitive capacities than ours)35. Szabo’-
Gendler argues that the neo-conservative fictionalist cannot explain why 
assenting to Moorean sentences is absurd:  
 
[In] having embraced the existence of a superior theory that is inaccessible to us, neo-
conservative fictionalists have tacitly committed themselves to the possibility of a certain 
                                                
35 Szabo’-Gendler envisions a sophisticated creature who has superior cognitive 
capacities than humans and is able to comprehend the theory that is superior to the F-
theory. However, this creature cannot explain this theory to us because we would be 
unable to comprehend it. Using this set up, he  argues that there is a context in which a 
Moorean sentence could be uttered assertively without absurdity. Thus, contrary to our 
intuitions, the neo-conservative fictionalist would have to admit that there is some 
context in which it is not absurd to utter assertively a Moorean sentence. But since this 
cannot be right –for, there is no context in which it is not absurd to utter such sentences 
assertively –it follows that neo-conservative fictionalism is false.  
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intermediate position between immersion and critical reflection. (2001: 302.)  
 
Thus, the neo-conservative fictionalist cannot say either that «there is…room in 
the middle» or that we are either «immersed in the game of make-believe or that 
we are evaluating it from without» (2001: 302). I agree with Szabo’-Gendler that 
this fictionalist position is perplexing, so I will not try to defend it. Rather, I shall 
argue that this problem does not arise for the account I have proposed. 
The proposed account does not recommend that we assent to propositions 
we do not believe. It rather recommends that we replace assertion with the act of 
make believe. In this view, when one utters “There are Fs”, one is not assenting 
to the proposition that there are Fs. Rather, one is engaging in an act of make 
believe –that is, one pretends that there are Fs. Therefore, the problem that might 
arise for the account Szabo’-Gendler is criticizing does not arise for the proposed 
account. To see this suppose that I utter “There are Fs, but I do not believe that 
there are Fs.” Although that would seem odd, it would not be absurd since it 
would involve a context shift. When I utter “There are Fs” I am merely 
pretending. But when I utter “I do not believe that there are Fs” I am asserting a 
true proposition. I thus move from the ordinary context, in which I utter the first 
conjunct, to a more critical context, in which I utter the second conjunct.  
Szabo’-Gendler acknowledges that this move is available to the proposed 
account, but insists that fictionalism is an absurd position because it is 
«encouraging us to continue the use of ‘S’ in a way that is outwardly 
indistinguishable from the way we used it before…it is [thus] not clear why we 
would refrain from uttering assertively  ‘S but I don’t believe that S’» (2001: 301). 
It is true that, in less critical contexts, fictive discourse is indistinguishable from 
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ordinary discourse. But, as have shown in § 2, the former discourse can be 
distinguished from the latter in more critical contexts. Since those who engage in 
make believe do not really believe the fictive judgments they make –they only 
pretend within less critical contexts that they do –they can step out of make 
believe when pressed.  
Further, the argument that any theory that encourages us to continue using 
the discourse in a way that is outwardly indistinguishable from the way we used 
it before is absurd applies to a variety of speech-acts such as irony, metaphor, or 
hyperbole36. Take irony, for example. When one speaks sarcastically, one implies 
the opposite of what one says. Suppose that upon meeting a rude person I utter 
‘She was so polite!’ to convey that the person is rude. Although I am uttering a 
statement that is indistinguishable from the statement uttered without sarcasm, 
this would not be a good reason for judging a theory of irony to be absurd, 
especially since there is no trouble distinguishing between what one says and 
what one implies. Similarly, it is not a good reason for judging fictionalism to be 
absurd. The fact that fictive discourse is outwardly indistinguishable from 
ordinary discourse in the ordinary context does not entail that fictionalism is 
absurd, so long as as they can be distinguished in a more critical context. 
Szabo’-Gendler recognizes that some fictionalist accounts such as the one 
proposed here can appeal to context shifts to resolve such problems, but argues 
that they are inferior to the neo-conservative account. According to Szabo’-
Gendler, only the neo-conservative account has a response to, what he calls, the 
                                                
36 I am assuming that metaphor implies a simile based on what was said; irony implies 
the opposite of what was said; and hyperbole implies an exaggeration of what was said. 
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‘standard challenge’, which is a point about explanation37. It purports to establish 
the truth of the claim that there are Fs on the basis that the F-theory is 
explanatory indispensable. If things look just as if they would have looked had 
there been Fs, then one explanation is that there are Fs. Szabo’-Gendler argues 
that although fictionalists explicitly deny this explanation, they continue to rely 
heavily on the F-theory which they say is false. In particular, Szabo’-Gendler 
claims that both fictionalists who are agnostic with respect to the F-theory and 
those who treat it as a fiction to be preserve despite that it is false have no 
satisfactory reply to the standard challenge38: 
 
Suppose that the sentences within the F-discourse are underwritten by a theory (the F-
theory, for short) that is at least tacitly held by those who competently engage in the 
discourse. Since the fictionalist believes that we frequently assent to sentences within the 
F-discourse that are untrue, she must hold that the F-theory is in error. But if the F-
theory plays a crucial role in a wide range of explanatory practices, then there is good 
reason to believe that it is part of our overall best theory. (2001: 294)  
 
One of the reasons Szabo’-Gendler thinks that fictionalists take the F-theory to 
«play a crucial role in a wide range of explanatory practices» is that he accepts 
the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument, which says that we ought to have 
ontological commitments to entities that are indispensable to our best scientific 
                                                
37 Szabo’-Gendler attributes the “standard challenge” to Putnam 1971 and Quine 1961. 
He also refers to it as the “Quine-Putnam challenge”. However, it is widely known as 
the ‘indispensability argument’. 
38 Szabo’-Gendler calls the former view “conservative factionalism” and the latter view 
“radical factionalism.” 
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theories39. (It is worth pointing out that this argument has been severely 
criticized over the years40.)  
What Szabo’-Gendler is not considering is that fictionalists need not accept 
that the F-theory is indispensible. Field (1980), for example, argues that contrary 
to appearances, mathematical entities are dispensable because mathematical 
theories do not have to be true in order to be useful in applications; they simply 
need to be conservative41. Mathematical theories are useful, according to Field, 
because they simplify calculations. Since their utility is merely pragmatic, it does 
not follow from the fact that they are useful that they are either true or 
indispensable42.  
The same can be said about the colour theory fictionalists treat as a fiction 
(to be preserved despite that it is false). Colour fictionalists can argue that 
contrary to appearances, colours are dispensable because colour theories do not 
                                                
39 The Quine-Putnam argument targets mathematical entities, but Szabo’-Gendler  seems 
to think it applies to most fictionalist accounts. However, he offers no support for this 
claim. The Quine-Putman argument is the following:  
 
P1. We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the entities that are 
indispensable to our best scientific theories. 
P2. Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories. 
C. We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities. 
 
For a detailed discussion see Mark Colyvan’s Stanford Encyclopedia entry, Indispensability 
arguments in the philosophy of Mathematics. 
40 Philip Kitcher argues that the argument does not show why mathematics are 
indispensable (see 1984: The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge, New York: Oxford Press); 
Penelope Mandy denies that we ought to have ontological commitments to all entities 
that are indispensable to scientific theories (see 1992: Indispensability and Practice, 
“Journal of Philosophy”, 89, 6, 275-289); and Elliot Sober  argues that mathematics does 
not receive confirmation from empirical evidence since it is employed by every scientific 
theory (see 1993: Mathematics and Indispensability, “Philosophical Review”, 102,1, 35-57). 
41 This roughly means that no consequences that follow from mathematics would fail to 
follow from a nominalistic scientific theory.  
42 Maddy also aims to undermine the plausibility of the first premise of the Quine-
Putnam argument by showing that confirmational holism should be rejected (see 1997: 
Naturalism in Mathematics, Oxford: Clarendon Press).  
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have to be true in order to be useful in applications; they simply need to be 
closed under ordinary logical consequence. Fictionalists can thus maintain that 
colour theories are useful because they simplify communication43. Since their 
utility is merely pragmatic, it does not follow from the fact that they are useful 
that they are either true or indispensable. Even colour realists share the belief 
that the «colors we perceive and talk about…are scientifically uninteresting 
kinds».44 Thus, pace Szabo’-Gendler, colour fictionalists who treat the colour 
theory as a fiction (to be preserve despite that it is false) do have a satisfactory 
reply to the standard challenge. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that Johnston’s claim that eliminativism about colour would 
deprive us of ordinary colour discourse is false. In doing so, I have outlined an 
eliminativist account, i.e., prescriptive colours fictionalism, which can preserve 
ordinary colour discourse in the absence of colours. In addition, I have shown 
that it fares better than colour realism and that it is consistent with our most 
current scientific findings. Lastly, I have defended it against various objections. 
Its only flaw seems to be that it goes against our intuition that objects are 
coloured. But since this intuition is not supported by scientific evidence, its flaw 
is only apparent.
                                                
43 Szabo’-Gendler seems to also accept Putnam’s assumption that what leads fictionalists 
to reject the F-theory is the mere possibility that it can be disconfirmed. This assumption, 
however, is questionable. 
44 Hilbert 1987: 27. Note that Hilbert denies that this shows that colors are not physical 
properties of objects.  
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